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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issues 
1. Did the district court mistakenly refuse to make 
Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligations retroactive 
to when he received notice of the Petition for Modification 
on the basis of a misinterpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended)? 
2. Did the district court improperly refuse to 
restore to Ms. Bradshaw, as the custodial parent, the tax 
dependency exemption for the parties' minor child without 
making any factual findings, although the parties stipulated 
that a legally sufficient change in their circumstances 
required that there be a modification of their existing 
order? 
II. Standard of Review 
There are no disputed facts in this case. Because Ms. 
Bradshaw accepts the district court's findings of facts and 
challenges only the lower court's legal conclusions, this 
court should review the decision below for correctness and 
should afford no deference to the district court's 
conclusions. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah 
App. 1992); Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 
2 
1990). A determination, based on stipulated facts, of 
whether there are sufficient grounds to modify an award of a 
tax dependency exemption is a legal conclusion subject to 
full review by this Court. 
Although a decision to make an increase in child 
support retroactive is a matter of discretion to be 
exercised by a trial court, the trial court must make 
appropriate and adequate findings to support its conclusion• 
Accordingly, this Court should review the order concerning 
retroactivity for abuse of discretion and should determine 
the adequacy of the findings to support the trial court7s 
exercise of discretion. Hill v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722 (Utah 
App. 1992); Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); 
Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Utah App. 
1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions determinative in this action 
are: 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (3) (1953 as amended)• 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support 
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, 
and dental care, or the distribution of property 
as is reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended). 
A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any 
period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that 
petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor 
is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the 
obligee is the petitioner. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended). 
With regard to child support orders, enactment of 
the guidelines and any subsequent change in the 
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for 
modification of a court order, if there is a 
difference of at least 25% between the existing 
order and the guidelines . . . . 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
The interpretation of two Utah statutory provisions lie 
at the heart of this case: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-7.2 and 
30-3-10.6 (2). Initially, this Court must construe Utah 
4 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended), which declares 
that a 25% difference between an existing order for child 
support and the amount prescribed by the guidelines will 
establish a substantial change of circumstances as a ground 
for modification of the existing order. While this 
provision asserts that the 25% figure is a sufficient basis 
for modification of an existing support order, the trial 
court concluded that a 25% difference is necessary for a 
modification — that in the absence of a 25% change between 
an existing child support obligation and the obligation 
determined under guidelines, there is no change in 
circumstances substantial enough to warrant a modification 
of the existing order. At the onset, this court must 
determine the validity of the trial court's reading of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6). 
Secondly, this court must determine what findings a 
trial court must make before it can refuse to modify an 
existing court order to award the custodial parent a tax 
dependency exemption. Although the parties in this case 
stipulated that a substantial change in circumstances 
warranted an increase in Mr. Blaine's child support 
obligations, the trial court failed to give a basis for its 
decision that there was not a sufficient change to warrant 
altering the portion of the existing decree which awarded to 
5 
Mr* Blaine the right to claim the tax dependency exemption. 
This Court must determine whether this decision can be 
appropriately made by the trial court without any factual 
findings. A copy of the original 1986 decree is attached as 
Exhibit "Eff. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On April 22, 1991, Ms, Bradshaw served Mr. Blaine with 
a Petition for Modification, (Exhibit "A"), which maintained 
that a substantial change of circumstances, not contemplated 
in the original divorce decree, necessitated a modification 
of the decree. Subsequently, on May 19, 1992, Ms. Bradshaw 
filed a Supplemental Petition to Modify the divorce decree. 
Exhibit "AA". Both of these petitions were heard on 
September 3, 1992, by the Honorable Anne Stirba, Third 
Judicial District Court Judge. On the facts stipulated to 
by the parties, Judge Stirba granted in part and denied in 
part Ms. Bradshaw's petitions. The trial court's ruling 
were embodied in the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, (Exhibit "B" attached), and an Order and 
Judgment, (Exhibit "C" attached), dated October 21, 1992 and 
October 19, 1992, respectively. 
Ms. Bradshaw now appeals the portions of Judge Stirba's 
decision and order which: 
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(1) denied her request to order Mr. Blaine to pay 
increased child support as of the date he was served with 
the Petition for Modification (April 22, 1991), and 
(2) denied her request to award her, as the custodial 
parent, the right to claim the child Allison as a dependent 
for the purposes of an income tax exemption. 
Ms. Bradshaw's notice of appeal was dated October 30, 
1992 and was timely filed. 
III. Statement of Facts 
The pertinent facts regarding Ms. Bradshaw's petitions 
for modification, (Exhibits "A11 & "AA" attached) , were 
uncontested and were stipulated to by the parties. These 
facts are recited in the Amended Findings of Fact signed by 
the trial court. (Exhibit "B" attached). Those undisputed 
facts are: 
1. The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff/ 
appellee, David Blaine ("Mr. Blaine") was a full time 
college student and his income was less than eight hundred 
dollars (<$800.00) per month. Ms. Bradshaw was employed 
full time as a school teacher at that time. Amended 
Findings, 5 1, Exhibit "B" attached. 
2. Since the divorce Mr. Blaine has completed his 
college education and is now employed full time by IBM in 
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New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) per month. Amended Findings, J 2, Exhibit flBlf 
attached. 
3. Ms. Bradshaw currently earns one thousand sixty-
five dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a 
public school teacher. Amended Findings, 5 3, Exhibit "B" 
attached. 
4. Allison, the child of the parties, was three (3) 
years old when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) 
years of age. The cost of caring for a nine (9) year old 
child today is greater than for caring for a three (3) year 
old child six years ago. Amended Findings, f 4, Exhibit "B" 
attached. 
5. The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided 
that Mr. Blaine would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty 
dollars ($250.00) per month in child support when his income 
exceeded one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars 
($1,250.00+) per month. The original decree had provisions 
for escalation of child support as Mr. Blaine/s income 
increased, but contained no provision for escalation after 
plaintiff's income substantially exceeded one thousand two 
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00+) per month. Amended 
Findings, 5 5, Exhibit "B" attached. 
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6. The original decree provided that for the years 
1986 - 1989 inclusive Ms. Bradshaw could claim Allison as a 
dependent and receive an exemption for income tax purposes. 
The original decree and existing order provided that for the 
year 1990 and each year thereafter Mr. Blaine could claim 
Allison as a dependent and receive an exemption for income 
tax purposes. When the decree was entered the parties 
anticipated that in 1990 Mr. Blaine would be earning more 
than Ms. Bradshaw and that at that time he would have 
greater use for the tax dependency exemption. Amended 
Findings, 5 6, Exhibit "B" attached. 
7. Mr. Blaine was served with the petition for 
modification on April 22, 1991. Amended Findings, 5 8, 
Exhibit "B" attached. 
8. In April, 1991 Mr. Blaine was earning only two 
thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) gross 
monthly salary working for IBM. In April, 1991 Ms. Bradshaw 
was earning one thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars 
($1,873.00) gross per month working full-time as a school 
teacher. Amended Findings, 1 9, Exhibit "B" attached. 
9. Under the statutory support guidelines, in April, 
1991, Mr. Blaine's child support obligation to the Ms. 
Bradshaw, if then recalculated, would have been two hundred 
ninety-five dollars ($295.00) per month. This sum 
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represents less than a twenty-five percent (<25%) increase 
in Mr. Blaine7s support obligation under the guidelines from 
the existing court order ($250.00) which was in effect in 
April 1991. Amended Findings, 5 10, Exhibit "B" attached. 
10. On or about October 15, 1991, the Mr. Blaine 
received an increase in his monthly gross income and since 
that date has been earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) gross per month. Amended Findings, 5 11, 
Exhibit "B" attached. 
11. Ms. Bradshaw claimed in her Petition to Modify 
that there was a substantial change in circumstances which 
allowed the trial court to reconsider and increase child 
support which as well allowed the trial court to reconsider 
and modify the decree with regard to which parent could 
claim Allison as a dependent for income tax purposes. The 
parties agreed that there was a substantial change in 
circumstances which allowed the trial court to reconsider 
and increase child support. Amended Findings, 5 13, Exhibit 
"B" attached. 
12. Other than the foregoing, Ms. Bradshaw presented 
no evidence to show a change in circumstances of the parties 
or to justify increasing child support or altering the award 
of the tax dependency exemption allowance. Amended 
Findings, 5 14, Exhibit "B" attached. 
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13. The parties stipulated that all of the foregoing 
facts were true and correct for the purpose of settlement of 
certain issues and for the purpose of presentation to the 
trial court of various pending legal issues as raised by the 
pleadings on file. Amended Findings, f 15, Exhibit "B" 
attached. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court made two errors when it refused to 
grant portions of Ms. Bradshaw's petitions for modification 
of the parties7 divorce decree. First, the district court 
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) when it 
concluded that the statute prevented Mr. Blaine's obligation 
to pay increased child support from being retroactive to the 
date he was served with the Petition for Modification 
("petition"). 
Section 78-45-7.2 (6) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
establishes that a 25% or more difference between an 
existing child support order and an obligation under Utah's 
child support guidelines is sufficient — by itself — to 
prove a substantial change in circumstances as a ground for 
modification of the existing order. Importantly, the 
statute does not suggest in any way that a modification of 
11 
an existing order is only appropriate when this 25% 
difference is present. 
However, the trial court adopted this latter and 
improper reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6), refusing to make Mr. 
Blaine's increased child support obligations retroactive to 
before October 15, 1991, simply because the 25% difference 
did not then exist. The trial court offered no other 
reasoning of findings for its conclusion. At the same time, 
the trial court ignored that the parties stipulated that 
three factors unrelated to the impact of the guidelines 
created a substantial change in circumstances. Because two 
of these factors were in existence on the date Mr. Blaine 
was served with the petition, the increase in his child 
support obligation should be made retroactive to the date of 
that service — April 22, 1991. 
Second, the district court failed to give any reasons 
or findings to support its decision that — although the 
parties' had stipulated that a substantial change in their 
circumstances warranted a modification in their existing 
child support agreement — this change did not justify 
modifying the existing decree to allow Ms. Bradshaw, as the 
custodial parent, to claim Allison as her dependent for the 
purposes of income taxes. This lack of appropriate findings 
was improper for several reasons. 
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Because Utah's child support guidelines assume that the 
tax dependency exemption is awarded the custodial parent, 
allocation of the exemption to the noncustodial parent runs 
contrary to the guidelines and requires explanation. 
Recently, this Court held that failure to follow the 
statutory child support guidelines absent findings of 
special circumstances is reversible error. Similarly, this 
Court determined that both federal tax law and the best 
interests of the child dictate that only when exceptional 
circumstances exist can the tax exemption be awarded to the 
noncustodial parent. However, no findings were made in this 
case to justify allowing Mr. Blaine to continue to claim 
Allison as his dependent. Indeed, given the stipulated 
facts, the tax dependency exemption cannot be properly 
awarded to the noncustodial parent. Again, trial court 
error demands the intervention of this Court to require that 
the tax exemption be granted to Ms. Bradshaw as the 
custodian of Allison. 
Because the parties have stipulated to the facts 
pertinent to this action and this Court is in as good a 
position to consider these facts as was the trial court, 
this Court is to draw its own legal conclusions from the 
facts. Accordingly, this Court should direct the trial 
court to enter an order establishing that Mr. Blaine's child 
13 
support obligation should be retroactive to the date he 
received notice of the petition and that, commencing with 
1992, Ms. Bradshaw should be again awarded the tax 
dependency exemption for Allison. 
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ARGUMENT1 
I. Mr. Blaine's Increased Child Support Obligation Should 
Be Made Retroactive to the Date He Received Notice of the 
Petition for Modification of the Parties' Divorce Decree. 
The trial court erred in denying Ms. Bradshaw's request 
to make Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligation to 
Allison retroactive to when he was served with the petition 
(April 22, 1991). Although the trial court has broad 
discretion to determine whether a modification in support 
should be retroactive, there must be adequate findings or 
conclusions to support the exercise of that discretion. 
Importantly, the trial court herein defended its decision 
only by reference to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as 
amended). However, because its analysis was based on 
improper interpretation of § 78-45-7.2 (6), the trial court 
necessarily failed to provide adequate findings to justify 
its decision. 
1
 As a preliminary matter, Ms. Bradshaw wants to 
clarify that she properly petitioned the trial court to 
modify the parties7 divorce decree. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(3) (1953 as amended) provides that a district court 
granting a divorce maintains continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree with regard to support and maintenance of 
minor children. A substantial change of circumstances of 
the parties, not contemplated in the decree, justifies 
modification of divorce decree. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 
713 (Utah App. 1990). Because she was able to establish a 
substantial change in her own circumstances and those of Mr. 
Blaine, Ms. Bradshaw properly petitioned the Third Judicial 
District Court to modify the parties' divorce decree. 
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In absence of adequate findings below and given the 
stipulated facts, this court should grant Ms. Bradshaw's 
request, ordering Mr. Blaine's increased child support 
obligation to be retroactive to April 22, 1991. The 
parties stipulated to three factors which established 
substantially changed circumstances and required 
modification of their existing child support agreement. 
Because two of these factors were present on April 22, 1991, 
the modification of the existing decree should be made 
effective as of that date. 
A. The Trial Court Must Provide Adequate Findings for its 
Decision Not to Make Mr. Blaine's Increased Child Support 
Obligation Retroactive to April 22, 1991. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended) grants 
discretion to a trial court to make child support 
modification retroactive to the date notice of petition 
given to the adverse party. However, this Court determined 
in Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992), 
that retroactive modification of a decree is at discretion 
of trial court, provided the court bases its decision upon 
appropriate findings. Without findings by the trial court, 
the parties are in no position to assess or challenge the 
trial courts decision. Id. at 820-821; Crouse v. Crouse, 
817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). In addition, without 
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factual findings and documented reasoning by the trial 
court, the appellate court is unable to review the 
proceedings below. Id.; See also, Allred v Allred, 835 P.2d 
974 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court must specify in its 
findings the reasons a tax exemption is not given to the 
noncustodial parent); Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 
(Utah App. 1990) (trial court must enter findings of fact on 
factors which constitute material issues); Motes v. Motes, 
786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 
P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988). 
When determining child support awards, including the 
retroactive effect of any modifications of these awards, the 
trial court must take into account "xnot only the needs of 
the child[], but also the ability of the parents to pay.'" 
Ostler v. Ostlerf 789 P.2d at 715, (quoting Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985)). Again, the 
failure of the trial court to make "specific findings on the 
statutory factors constitutes reversible error." Id. 
Similarly, the lack of sufficient findings to explain the 
trial court7s refusal to make the modification of the 
parties' divorce decree retroactive to April 22, 1991, 
requires the intervention of this Court. 
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E. Utah Code Ann. § 78*45-7.2 (6) (1953 as Amended) Does 
Not Restrict the Authority of Courts to Modify Existing 
Child Support Orders to Instances Where There Is a 25% 
Difference Between the Support Determined by the Existing 
Order and that Determined by the Guidelines. 
The only factual finding supporting the trial courts 
decision not to make Mr. Blaine's child support increase 
retroactive to the date he was served with the petition was 
based upon an improper reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 
(6) (1953 as amended). Referring to § 78-45-7.2 (6), the 
trial court contended: 
Under the statutory support guidelines, in April, 
1991, plaintiff's child support obligation to the 
defendant, if then re-calculated, would have been 
two hundred ninety-five dollars ($295.00) per 
month. Said sum represents less than a twenty-
five percent (<25%) increase in plaintiff's 
support obligation under the guidelines from the 
existing court order ($250.00) in effect in April 
1991. 
Findings, 5 10 at 4, Exhibit HB,f attached. Clearly, the 
trial court was interpreting § 78-45-7.2 (6) to mean that 
only when there was at least 25% difference between an 
existing child support order and an obligation calculated 
under the "new" guidelines, could be the basis for a 
substantial change in the parties' circumstances for the 
purposes of a modification of the existing order.2 The 
trial court did not explain how the factors which lead to a 
2
 There is no case law to support the trial court's 
improper.reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6). 
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stipulation by the parties that a substantial change in 
their circumstances had indeed occurred, effected its 
conclusion that the increased in child support did not 
require that this modification be retroactive to April 22, 
1991. Instead, the trial court relied exclusively on an 
inappropriate reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) 
(1953 as amended). 
A careful reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6) indicates that 
this section provides that the 25% figure is a sufficient 
basis for modification of an existing support order. The 
statute in no way mandates that a 25% difference is 
necessary for a modification. Under § 78-45-7.2 (6), the 
trial court remains free to find a substantial change in 
circumstances on the basis of factors other than the impact 
of the guidelines on a calculation of child support — the 
25% is "a ground for modification of a court order," not the 
only ground for a modification. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 
(6) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). The trial court can 
modify an existing order if it finds a material change of 
circumstances independent of the impact of the guidelines.3 
3
 That the legislature intended to allow the trial 
court a means independent of the 25% difference to find a 
substantial change in circumstances is made obvious by 
reference to the pre-1990 amendment provision (§ 78-45-7.2 
(l)(b)) which was replaced by § 78-45-7.2 (6). Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.2, amendment notes (wrongly stating that § 
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Id. Because the trial court improperly cited § 78-45-7.2 
(6) for its conclusion and failed to consider the 
appropriate factors to determine the retroactivity of its 
child support order, this court should draw its own legal 
conclusions from the stipulated facts. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992); Smith v. Smith. 
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
C. Proper Interpretation of the Stipulated Facts Indicate 
that Mr. Blaine,s Child Support Obligation to Allison Should 
Be Retroactive to April 22, 1991. 
Inappropriately applying Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) 
(1953 as amended) to the issue of retroactivity, the trial 
court ignored that the parties stipulated that three (3) 
factors, unrelated to the impact of the guidelines, were 
sufficient to establish a substantial change in circum-
stances for the purposes of modification of Mr. Blaine's 
child support obligations. Because two of these factors 
were in existence on the date Mr. Blaine was served with the 
78-45-7.2 (l)(b) was replaced by § 78-45-7.2 (5)). The pre-
1990 provision concludes that although the impact of the * 
guidelines on existing child support orders did not 
constitute a substantial change in circumstances, "if the 
court finds a material change of circumstances independent 
of the guidelines," a modification is appropriate. Id. 
Thus, the 25% rule of thumb was meant to amend the pre-1990 
reference to the impact of the guidelines, not to displace 
an independent finding of changed circumstances. 
20 
petition, the increase in his child support obligation 
should be made retroactive to the date of that service — 
April 22, 1991. 
The parties agreed that three factors contributed to a 
change in their circumstances, substantial enough to warrant 
a modification of their divorce decree. These factors were: 
(1) a large increase in Mr. Blaine's salary, (2) a decrease 
in Ms. Bradshaw's salary and (3) an increase in the cost of 
caring for Allison. On April 22, 1991, the date Mr. Blaine 
received notice of Ms. Bradshaw's petition, two of these 
factors contributed to a substantial change in 
circumstances. Mr. Blaine was earning two thousand eight 
hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) per month, more than 
double the maximum one thousand two hundred and fifty dollar 
($1,250.00) monthly income anticipated by the divorce 
decree. In addition, the cost of caring for Allison was 
increasing — she was older and inflation was causing the 
general cost of living to rise. 
These factors alone — independent of the impact of the 
guidelines upon Mr. Blaine's child support obligations — 
constituted a legally sufficient change in circumstances to 
warrant modification of the existing order. Accordingly, 
the child support increase should be made retroactive to 
April 22, 1991. Only such an order would properly consider 
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"*not only the needs of the child[]f but also the ability of 
the parents to pay,"1 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715, 
(quoting Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 
1985)), and properly assure that Allison's "standard of 
living [is] comparable to that which [she] would have 
experienced if no divorce had occurred." Peterson v. 
Peterson, 784 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah App. 1988); Ostler, supra 
at 716. 
II. Ms. Bradshaw, as the Custodial Parent, Should Be Award 
the Tax Dependency Exemption for Allison. 
The trial court also erred when it refused to alter the 
portion of the existing decree which awards Mr. Blaine the 
tax dependency exemption for Allison. Although the trial 
court concluded that there was a sufficient change in 
circumstances to warrant a modification of the parties' 
support obligations, the trial court provided no findings or 
justification for its decision not to transfer the tax 
exemption to Ms. Bradshaw, the custodial parent. In 
addition, the trial court failed to address the factors 
specified by this court under Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 
(Utah App. 1989) before it refused to grant the tax 
exemption to the custodial parent. Because of the 
inadequacy of the findings below and given the stipulated 
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facts, this court should reverse the trial court order and 
award to Ms. Bradshaw the tax exemption for Allison. 
A. Given the Parties7 Substantially Changed Circumstances, 
the Trial Court Must Make Appropriate Findings Before it 
Refuses to Transfer the Tax Exemption to the Custodial 
Parent. 
In the presence of a material change in circumstances, 
the trial court must make adequate findings before it can 
decline to modify an existing award of a tax exemption. 
This Court recently held that failure to follow the 
statutory child support guidelines absent findings of 
special circumstances is reversible error. Hill v. Hill, 
841 P.2d at 724. Because the trial court recalculated the 
parties' child support obligations in light of changed 
circumstances, its subsequent decision must either conform 
to the guidelines or be justified by adequate findings. 
However, the trial court departed from the guidelines 
without justifying the departure. 
Importantly, Utah's child support guidelines assume 
that the custodial parent is awarded the tax dependency 
exemption.4 Since 1984, when Congress amended the tax code 
4
 According to the Utah Child Support Task Force, 
Report On Proposed Child Support Guidelines, May 1988 (p. 6, 
5 I, E.), "The basic child support figures are further 
adjusted reflecting the assumption that the custodial parent 
would receive the exemptions for all children. If the 
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regarding exemption allowance in divorce, the custodial 
parent has been automatically entitled to the available 
dependency exemptions unless he/she signs a written declara-
tion otherwise. 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2)(A) (1988); Motes v. 
Motes, 786 P.2d at 235-36 (recognizing a presumption created 
by federal law that the custodial parent receive the exemp-
tion) . Indeed, in Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 950 
(Utah App. 1988), this Court insisted that it did not have 
the authority to grant an exemption contrary to the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, only when 
the best interests of the child so requires, will the courts 
order a custodial parent to sign a declaration of waiver 
consistent with § 152 of tax code.5 Allred v. Allred, 835 
P.2d at 978. Finally, fairness requires that the guidelines 
be assumed to vest the tax exemption in the custodial 
parent. Realistically, the custodial parent is often faced 
with expenses beyond those which are contemplated and 
calculated by the guidelines on the basis of income alone. 
Indeed, any expenses which go beyond those anticipated by 
custodial parent relinquishes the exemptions, this could be 
grounds for an adjustment in the basic award." 
5
 N.B.: Neither the original decree herein (Exhibit 
"E") nor the order of modification (Exhibit "C") order the 
defendant custodial parent to annually execute and deliver 
the necessary I.R.S. required document. 
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the guidelines must be met by the custodial parent alone and 
can only be offset by awarding the tax exemption to the 
custodial parent. In combination, each of the 
considerations — federal law, judicial interpretation and 
policy concerns — establish that the guidelines presume 
that the tax exemption is awarded to the custodial parent. 
Several other factors mandate that the trial court 
satisfactorily justify its decision not to award tax 
exemptions to the custodial parent. Recently, this Court 
specified two elements to be considered before a court will 
order the custodial parent to waive her tax exemption: 
First, the noncustodial parent must have a higher 
income and provide the majority of support for the 
child. Second, the trial court must, from its 
findings, determine that by transferring the 
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent . 
. [it is] in the best interest of the child, which 
in all but exceptional circumstances would 
translate into an increased support level for the 
child. 
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978. Without findings and 
explanation as to these requirements,6 the trial court 
cannot properly determine whether to modify an existing 
award of the tax exemption to the noncustodial parent. 
6
 The non-custodial parent herein, Mr. Blaine was 
ordered in the modification to pay only the amount required 
under the guidelines. 
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Alternatively, if the trial court orders that the 
custodial parent give up the tax exemption, it must also 
justify this decision. As established in Allred, the trial 
court must, in such cases, "consider whether the best 
interests of the child require[] an increase in child 
support to reflect the reduction in the tax burden of [the 
noncustodial parent]." Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978, 
n.l. 
Finally, adequate findings are particularly necessary 
to proper resolution of this case. As was true in Fullmer, 
761 P.2d 942, this case does not involve an order directing 
that Ms. Bradshaw, as the custodial parent, give up her 
right to claim Allison as her dependent. See, Motes v. 
Motes, 786 P.2d at 234. Therefore, under the Fullmer 
doctrine, the trial court does not have the power to "grant 
the exemption contrary to the provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code." Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 950. If the trial 
court wishes to order Ms. Bradshaw to annually execute and 
deliver the necessary document to waive her right to claim 
Allison as a dependent, then proper findings by the trial 
court justifying this action are especially appropriate. 
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B. Because of a Lack of Findings and Stipulated Facts 
Below, this Court Should Award to Ms. Bradshaw, as the 
Custodial Parent, the Right to Claim the Tax Dependency 
Exemption for Allison. 
Because the trial court failed to adequately consider 
the appropriate factors necessary to rebut the presumption 
that the custodial parent is entitled to any available tax 
dependency exemptions, its decision should be vacated. In 
addition, because the trial court's decision was based on 
stipulated facts, this court should draw its own legal 
conclusions on the basis of these facts. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992); Smith v. Smith. 
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
Under Motes. two requirements must be met before a 
court can award a tax exemption to the noncustodial parent. 
First, the noncustodial parent must have a higher income and 
provide the majority of support for the child. Motes, 835 
P.2d at 978. Although Mr. Blaine's contribution to Alli-
son's support is 76% of the guideline total, this number 
alone cannot prove that Mr. Blaine provides a majority of 
the support for Allison. Given that the guidelines assume 
that the custodial parent is entitled to the tax exemption, 
referring to the guidelines to establish whether the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the exemption would beg 
the question. Such reasoning would essentially allow the 
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court to derive the allocation of the tax exemption from 
guidelines which already assume the allocation of the 
exemption.7 
Finally, and more clearly, Allison's best interests 
would be best served by allocating the tax dependency 
exemption to her custodial parent. As determined in Motes, 
in all but rare circumstances, the transfer of the 
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent should be 
accompanied by "an increased support level for the child." 
Motes at 978. Yet, in this case, Mr. Blaine has been 
ordered to pay only the amount specified by the support 
guidelines and nothing more. Under Motes and absent any 
particular findings, Allison's best interests are not served 
by the present arrangement. Accordingly, this Court should, 
consistent with Motes, award the tax dependency exemption to 
Ms. Bradshaw as custodian of Allison. 
7
 Alternatively, if the guidelines do not embody an 
assumption about allocation of the tax exemption, to refer 
to them to establish the allocation would also be inappro-
priate. Unless it is assumed that the guidelines award the 
tax exemption to the custodial parent, the statute would 
unfairly burden the custodial parent with the added expense 
of providing for the child's needs which could not be 
anticipated by basing child support on income alone without 
compensating the custodian for these expenses by awarding 
her the tax exemption. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should determine that because it failed to 
make adequate findings (and lacked suitable factual 
determinations to support the required findings) and based 
its conclusion upon an ill-founded reading of Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.2 (6), the trial court erred when it refused to 
make Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligation 
retroactive to April 22, 1991. In light of the substantial 
change in circumstances which had occurred before April 22, 
1991, this Court should conclude that consideration of 
Allison's best interests and the ability of her parents to 
meet their support obligations requires that the increase be 
retroactive to the date upon which Mr. Blaine was served 
with the Ms. Bradshaw's petition. 
This Court should also determine that, in this case, 
before a court can order Ms. Bradshaw to waive her right to 
claim Allison as a dependent for tax purposes, it must make 
the appropriate findings under Allred. In addition, this 
Court should hold that if sufficient grounds exist to allow 
a trial court to modify an existing child support amount to 
conform with the statutory guidelines, those same grounds 
mandate the reconsideration of an order allowing the non-
custodial parent to claim a child as a dependent for the 
purposes of a tax exemption. Finally, this Court should 
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determine that Ms. Bradshaw is entitled to claim an 
exemption for Allison on her taxes. Because Mr. Blaine's 
support obligation is based upon the statutory guidelines 
which presume that the custodial parent is entitled to the 
tax exemption and there has been no showing that his 
obligation has been increased beyond the guidelines to 
account for the tax benefit he will receive, Allison's best 
interests are served by allowing her custodial parent to 
claim the exemption. 
The decision of the trial court as to these two issues 
is manifestly in error and should be vacated. This Court 
should direct the trial court to enter an order requiring 
that Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligation be 
retroactive to April 22, 1991 to the amount of two hundred 
ninety-five dollars ($295.00)>per month, (Findings, 5 10 at 
4, Exhibit "B" attached), and that Allison's best interests 
will be served by awarding Ms. Bradshaw, as her custodian, 
the tax dependency exemption commencing in 1992. 
DATED this 8th day of MARCH, 1993. 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
30 
EXHIBITS 
("A") Petition to Modify Decree, April 22, 1991. 
("AA") Supplemental Petition to Modify, 
May 19, 1992. 
("B") Amended Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law, October 21, 1992. 
("C") Order and Judgment, October 19, 1992. 
("D") Notice of Appeal, October 30, 1992. 
("E") Original Decree of Divorce, May 1, 1986. 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID B1AINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE, 
Defendant. 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
: DECREE 
: Civil No. 86-4900291 
: (Hon. Leonard H. Russon) 
t 
The defendant by and through counsel petitions and 
moves this court as follows: 
1. The parties were divorced pursuant to a decree 
entered herein on May 2, 1986. 
2. Since the entry of the decree there has been 
significant changes in the circumstances of the parties. 
The plaintiff has moved to the state of New York and is 
earning substantially more now than he was at the time the 
decree was entered. The cost of raising children has 
substantially increased since 1986. 
3. The Utah Legislature has set specific child support 
guidelines which detail the child support obligations and 
requirements to be adequate for the care and maintenance of 
children. 
4. It is reasonable, proper and necessary that the 
decree herein be modified so that the plaintiff's child 
support obligation and all of the terms relative to the care 
of the children be modified to comply with the current 
statutory guidelines. 
5. It is reasonable, proper and necessary that the 
plaintiff be required to maintain a life insurance policy on 
his life in the sum of at least $100,000.00 (One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars) naming the minor children of the parties 
as beneficiaries during their minority and designating,the 
defendant as the trustee to administer the proceeds for 
those policies. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands that the decree be 
modified in conformance with the foregoing petition. 
DATED t h i s / ^ y day of APRIL, 1991, 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE to: 
HARRY CASTON 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
on the ^ >ly day of APRIL, 1991, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE, 
Defendant• 
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION 
: TO MODIFY 
Civil No. 86-4900291 
: (Hon. A. Stirba) 
The defendant Pamela Bradshaw (Blaine) by and through 
her counsel as a supplement to the pending petition for 
modification in the above matter presents this supplemental 
petition and hereby specifically requests that the defendant 
be allowed to claim the minor child of the parties as a 
dependant for income tax purposes in addition to the relief 
sought in her prior and pending petition for modification. 
DATED this day of MAY, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION TO 
MODIFY to: 
HARRY CASTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
on the/2j2§5 day of MAY, 1992, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
bndsupp .pet/asb/divay 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAMELA BRADSHAW 
Defendant. 
(BLAINE), : 
AMENDED 
: FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-4900291 
(Hon. Anne Stirba) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court 
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon* Anne 
Stirba, judge presiding, the hearing being held on September 
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by 
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in 
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the 
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several 
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to 
the Court as legal issues, and the Court having on Friday, 
October 9, 1992 at 10:00 a.m. discussed with counsel the 
contents and terms of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to be entered herein and having made some amendments 
thereto, based thereon and for good cause appearing, the 
Court hereby makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff 
was a full time college student and his income was less than 
eight hundred dollars (<$800.00) per month. Defendant was 
employed full time as a teacher at that time. 
2. Since the divorce the plaintiff has completed his 
college education and is now employed full time by IBM in 
New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) per month. 
3. Defendant currently earns one thousand sixty-five 
dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a public 
school teacher. 
4. The child of the parties was three (3) years old 
when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) years of age. 
The cost of caring for a nine year old child today is 
greater than for caring for a three year old child six years 
ago. 
5. The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided 
that plaintiff would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty 
2 
dollars ($250.00) per month in child support when his income 
exceeded one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars 
($1,250.00+) per month. The original decree had provisions 
for escalation of child support as plaintiff's income 
increased, but contained no provision for escalation after 
plaintiff's income substantially exceeded one thousand two 
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00) per month. 
6. The original decree provided that for the years 
1986 - 1989 inclusive the defendant could claim the child as 
a dependent and receive an exemption for income tax 
purposes. The original decree and existing order provided 
that for the year 1990 and each year thereafter the 
plaintiff could claim the child as a dependent and receive 
an exemption for income tax purposes. When the decree was 
entered the parties anticipated that in 1990 the plaintiff 
would be earning more than the defendant and that at that 
time he would have greater use for the dependency/exemption 
claim of the child. 
7. The original decree made no provision for life 
insurance on either parties' life for the benefit of the 
child. The parties stipulated and agreed that the decree 
should be modified to require each party to maintain life 
insurance coverage on their own life in the sum of at least 
3 
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) naming the minor 
child as beneficiary during her minority naming the other 
party as trustee of those proceeds. 
8. Plaintiff was served with the petition for 
modification on April 22, 1991. 
9. In April, 1991 plaintiff was earning only two 
thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) gross 
monthly salary working for IBM. In April, 1991 defendant 
was earning one thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars 
($1,873.00) gross per month working full-time as a school 
teacher. 
10. Under the statutory support guidelines, in April, 
1991, plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant, 
if then re-calculated, would have been two hundred ninety-
five dollars ($295.00) per month. Said sum represents less 
than a twenty-five percent (<25%) increase in plaintiff's 
support obligation under the guidelines from the existing 
court order ($250.00) in effect in April 1991. 
11. On or about October 15, 1991, the plaintiff 
received an increase in his monthly gross income and since 
that date has been earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) gross per month. 
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12. Plaintiff has accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in 
child support based upon his non-payment as agreed to by the 
parties between August, 1989 and December 1991 inclusive, of 
the full amount ($250.) as required by the decree. That 
amount ($2,350.00) should be off-set against the equitable 
lien ($2,217.00) plaintiff had against the former marital 
home of the parties. Thus, there is a net balance due 
defendant from plaintiff for the sum of one hundred thirty-
three dollars ($133.) representing the accumulated arrears 
less the equitable lien. The plaintiff's equitable lien 
should be extinguished. Plaintiff no longer has any claim 
or interest in the real property known as: 
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE 
ADDITION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Book "F" of Plats 
at page 101 of the records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, State of Utah, 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as: 
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in 
the sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars. With 
that judgment plaintiff's child support obligation through 
and including August, 1992 as provided for under the 
original decree has been satisfied. 
13. Defendant claimed in her Petition to Modify that 
there was a substantial change in circumstances which 
5 
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support 
as well as to allow the court to re-consider and modify the 
decree with regard to which parent could claim the child as 
a dependent for income tax purposes. The parties agreed 
that there was a substantial change in circumstances which 
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support. 
14. Other than the foregoing, defendant presented no 
evidence to show a change in circumstances of the parties or 
to justify increasing child support or altering the award of 
the tax dependency exemption allowance. 
15. The parties stipulated that all of the foregoing 
facts were true and correct for the purpose of settlement 
and for the purpose of presentation to the Court of various 
pending legal issues as raised by the pleadings on file. 
16. The defendant incurred court costs in the pursuit 
of her petition to modify. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING and for good cause appearing, 
the Court makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
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2. The plaintiff's child support obligation'should be 
increased in light of a legally sufficient substantial 
change in circumstances set forth in the findings of fact. 
3. The substantial change in circumstances of the 
parties set forth above justifies modification of 
plaintiff's child support obligation. Under the statutory 
guidelines based upon the parties' current incomes and 
incomes as of October 15, 1991, plaintiff's child support 
obligation has increased by more than twenty-five per cent 
(>25%) over his obligation provided in the existing order. 
Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended) 
in light of that twenty-five percent (>25%) increase, the 
plaintiff's child support obligation should be increased to 
the sum of three hundred twenty-two dollars ($322.00) per 
month. 
4. The increased child support set forth in the 
foregoing paragraphs is in conformance with and is based 
upon the statutory guidelines, Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 
(1953 as amended). The sum of three hundred and twenty-two 
dollars ($322.00) per month is the exact amount provided 
under said guidelines. Under the guidelines said sum 
($322.00) represents seventy-six (76%) of the necessary 
7 
support amount established by the guidelines based upon the 
combined incomes of the parties. 
5. Because the increase in plaintiff's salary to three 
thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081*00) gross per month 
occurred on October 15, 1991, the increase in plaintiff's 
child support obligation should be retroactive, pursuant to 
Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended), only to 
October 15, 1991. 
6. The child support shall not be retroactive to when 
the plaintiff was served with the Petition for Modification 
(April 22, 1991) because as of that date based upon the 
parties' respective incomes at that time the increase in 
child support under the guidelines was less than one hundred 
twenty-five percent (<125%) of plaintiff's support 
obligation under the existing order. A substantial change 
of circumstances for the purpose of increasing child support 
does not occur unless there is an increase of at least 
twenty-five percent (25%) from the existing court ordered 
amount to the proposed new increased amount of support. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended). •> Based upon the 
foregoing, the increase in child support should not be 
retroactive to April 22, 1991, but only to October 15, 1991. 
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7. Plaintiff owes to defendant ten (10) months at 
$72.00 per month (November, 1991 - through August, 1992 
inclusive) plus $36.00 for one/half of the month of October, 
1991 for a total of seven hundred fifty-six dollars 
($756.00) as a result of the retroactive effect of the child 
support increase. Defendant should be granted a judgment 
for that amount against plaintiff. 
8. There has not been a substantial change in circum-
stances of the parties sufficient to warrant altering the 
portion of the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the 
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent 
and thus claim an exemption for income tax purposes. 
9. Based upon the stipulation of the parties, each 
party should be ordered to secure and maintain one hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in life insurance on their 
respective lives, naming the minor child as the beneficiary 
during her minority naming the other party as trustee of 
those proceeds. 
10. Plaintiff's accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in 
child support should be" off-set against the equitable lien 
($2,217.00) plaintiff has against the former marital home of 
the parties. Thus, there is a net balance due defendant 
from plaintiff for the sum of one hundred thirty-three 
9 
dollars ($133.00) representing the difference between the 
accumulated arrears and plaintiff's equitable lien. 
Plaintiff's equitable lien should be extinguished. 
Plaintiff shall no longer have any lien, claim or interest 
in the real property known as: 
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE ADD-
ITION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Book flF", of Plats 
at page 101, records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder, State of Utah, 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as: 
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in 
the net sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars, 
thereupon plaintiff's child support obligation through and 
including August, 1992 as provided for under the original 
decree will be satisfied. 
11. Defendant is entitled to an award of her costs 
pursuant to Rule 54 (d)(1), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 
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12. An order and judgment should be entered in 
conformance with the foregoing amended findings and 
conclusions. 
DATED this L\ ~~ day of OCTOBER, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed and fax'd a 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
HARRY CASTON 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
on the 9th day of October, 1992, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
diva\hlrj\bradfin3 .mod \ b l t lb 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE), : 
Defendant. : 
: ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-4900291 
(Hon. Anne Stirba) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court 
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon. Anne 
Stirba, judge presiding, the hearing being held on September 
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by 
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in 
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the 
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several 
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to 
the Court as legal issues, the Court having previously made 
1 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
based thereon and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. The plaintiff's child support obligation is 
increased in light of a legally sufficient substantial 
change in circumstances set forth in the findings of fact. 
2. The plaintiff's child support obligation is 
increased to the sum of three hundred twenty-two dollars 
($322.00) per month. 
3. The increase in plaintiff's child support obli-
gation is retroactive, pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 
(2) (1953 as amended) to October 15, 1991. As a result of 
the retroactive effect of the child support increase, 
defendant is granted a judgment against plaintiff for the 
sum of ($756.00) seven hundred fifty-six dollars. 
4. The request of defendant to make the increased 
child support retroactive to when the plaintiff was served 
with the Petition for Modification (April 22, 1991) is 
denied. 
5. The request of defendant to alter the portion of 
the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the right to 
2 
claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent and thus 
claim an exemption for income tax purposes is denied. 
6. Each party is ordered to secure and maintain one 
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in life insurance on 
their respective lives, naming the minor child as the 
beneficiary during her minority naming the other party as 
trustee of those proceeds. 
7. Plaintiff's accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in 
child support is off-set against the equitable lien 
($2,217.00) plaintiff has against the former marital home of 
the parties. Plaintiff's equitable lien is extinguished. 
Plaintiff no longer has any lien, claim or interest in the 
real property known as: 
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE ADD-
ITION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Book "F", of Plats 
at page 101, records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder, State of Utah, 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as: 
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
Defendant is granted a judgment against plaintiff in the net 
sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars, whereupon 
plaintiff's child support obligation through and including 
August, 1992 as provided for under the original decree is 
found to be satisfied. 
3 
12. Defendant is awarded her costs pursuant to Rule 54 
(d)(1), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. in the sum of fifty-six dollars 
($56.00). 
DATED this ( f-^* day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
hi 
/STIHBA ANNE  
JUDGE ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to: 
HARRY CASTON 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
12 00 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
on the 10th day of September, 1992, on the 1st day of 
October, and on the 9th day of October, 1992 postage prepaid 
in the United States Postal Service and by fax on October 9, 
1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
diva\hlrj\bradfin3 .mod \ b m b 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE), ! 
Defendant. : 
; NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 86-4900291 
(Hon. Anne Stirba) 
THE DEFENDANT by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard 
hereby gives notice of her appeal in the above captioned 
matter of the decision, ruling and order of the Court 
entered as a result of the hearing September 3, 1992 at 9:30 
a.nu, denying to defendant certain relief requested in 
plaintiff's petitions for modification, to-wit: 
(a) Denying the request of defendant to make the 
increased child support retroactive to when the plaintiff 
was served with the Petition for Modification (April 22, 
1991); and, 
(b) Denying the request of defendant to alter the 
portion of the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the 
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent 
and thus claim an exemption for income tax purposes is 
denied. 
Said rulings are embodied in Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment dated 
October 21st, 1992 and October 19, 1992 respectively. 
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
HARRY CASTON 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
on the 30th day of October, 1992, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
diva\hlrj\bradappe.not\bmb 
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LAURA L. BOYER - 3767 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3167 West 4700 South 
West Valley City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: (801) 964-6100 j 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No- D86-291 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
ooOOoo 
THIS MATTER came on regularly to be heard before the 
above court, sitting without a jury, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, presiding, this 1st day of May, 1986, The plaintiff was 
present in court, and represented by his counsel, Laura L. 
Boyer. The defendant did not appear, but having previously 
entered her Entry of Appearance, Waiver, and Stipulation filed 
herein, her default has been entered. The court, having heard 
the evidence and reviewed all pleadings on file herein, and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 
hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce, 
the same to become final and absolute upon entry. 
2. CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION, SUPPORT: During their 
EXHIBIT 
marriage one (1) child has been born to the parties; to wit: 
ALLISON BLAINE, born February 14, 1983. The defendant is 
awarded her care, custody, and control, subject to the 
plaintiff's liberal rights of visitation and summer visits, 
provided the plaintiff gives to defendant at least twenty-four 
(24) hours notice of his intent to exercise his rights of 
visitation, said visitations to include, but not be limited to, 
the following: two (2) days per week out of Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Thursday, with one preceding night; one day and 
night per weekend, to alternate each week between Saturday and 
ffjfidayj beginning December 24, 1986, and each alternating year, 
Christmas Eve through December 25 at 11:00 a.m.; 1/2 day on 
Allison's Birthday; alternating other holidays, and, in the 
event either party resides outside Salt Lake County, one (1) 
continual summer month (or two (2) two week periods, split u p ) . 
3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant, on or 
before the first day of each month, temporary and permanent 
child support in the amount of One hundred twenty-five dollars 
($125.00) per month. Said child support shall automatically 
escalate (without the necessity of court intervention) if and 
when plaintiff's income increases as follows: between eight 
hundred thirty-three dollars ($833.00) to one thousand two 
hundred fifty dollars ($1,250.00) gross income per month, the 
support shall be two hundred dollars ($200.00) per month; and, 
above one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250.00) the 
support shall be two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00). 
Plaintiff shall supply defendant with Form 1040, by May 1, of 
following year as proof of income. 
4. Plaintiff's child support obligation should conti-
nue until said child reaches age eighteen (18) or until the end 
of the school year in which she has reached the age of eighteen 
(18), provided that it should terminate at an earlier age, if 
the child has become otherwise emancipated, or at a later age if 
the child remains dependent by reason of physical or mental 
disease or defect. 
5. MEDICAL INSURANCE AND EXPENSES: Defendant is 
srd§FSd to maintain coverage for the said child of the parties 
under a policy of major medical insurance for so long as the 
child is within the age limits allowed by the policy. If the 
same becomes unavailable to defendant, she should provide 
plaintiff with notice thereof. 
6. Each party is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of all 
medical, dental orthodontic, and optical expenses which are not 
covered by insurance necessarily incurred for their minor child. 
7. ALIMONY: Neither party is awarded alimony. 
8. HOME: The real property of the parties, situated 
at 555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, State of Utah is awarded 
to the defendant. Plaintiff is ordered to sign a quit-claim 
deed conveying the above-described property to defendant subject 
to a lien in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred and 
Seventeen Dollars ($2,217.00), and subject to defendant assuming 
all known liabilities on this property, holding plaintiff 
harmless for any liability thereon. 
9. Said aforementioned lien is ordered to be paid by 
defendant to plaintiff upon the first of the following 
conditions to occur: rental or sale of the home; or within ten 
(10) years after divorce decree entered herein. 
10. ASSETS: During their marriage the parties acquired 
household furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances 
which have been equitably divided between themselves and which 
are awarded pursuant to this division. 
11. Each party is awarded his or her personal effects. 
12. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: Each party is ordered to 
assume and pay all obligaions incurred by him or her after the 
separation of the parties. 
13. TAXES: Defendant is entitled to claim the minor 
child as dependency exmptions for income tax purposes up to and 
including 1989. Plaintiff is entitled to claim the minor child 
of the parties as dependency exemption from 1990 and beyond. 
14. VEHICLES: The vehicles of the parties are awaded as 
follows: to plaintiff, the 1977 Subaru GF; to defendant, the 
1983 Subaru GL, subject to her assuming and paying the 
liabilities thereon and holding plaintiff harmless for any 
1iability thereon. 
15. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS: Plaintiff is ordered to 
assume and pay his own attorney's fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
16. DOCUMENTS AND LOCATION: Each party is ordered to 
duly execute and deliver all documents necessary to effect the 
Decree of Divorce. 
DATED , 1986. 
BY THE 
s^j.—£~/^J 
(Leonard H. Russon, JXTdge 
ATTEST 
tf. DIXON HINDLEY 
C§rfc 
^D&IuiyCtork 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decree of Divorce were mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
Defendan PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE, at her last known address of 
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 on the <? day 
of April, 1986. 
•4^. A^U 
